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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ..: 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981249-CA 
vs. : 
MELANIE E. POMIKALA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant, Melanie E. Pomikala, appeals her conviction of falsely making, coding, 
or signing a financial transaction card, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1995). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering restitution to be paid to a 
direct victim of defendant's criminal activities? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appellate court will not disturb an order of restitution unless the trial court 
exceeded its authority or abused its discretion. State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695, 696 
(Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah App. 1993), 
cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994); State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 868 
(Utah App. 1992)). However, where the trial court's order is premised on statutory 
interpretation, the appellate court affords the trial court's interpretation no deference and 
reviews it for correctness. Id (citing Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757, 759 
(Utah 1990)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
resolution of the issues before this Court is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 2, 1995, defendant Melanie E. Pomikala was charged by information 
with one count of falsely making, coding, or signing a financial transaction card, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1995), or, 
in the alternative, one count of theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1995) & 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995) (R. 5-6). 
On November 17, 1995, defendant pleaded guilty to falsely making, coding, or 
signing a financial transaction card, a third degree felony, and the theft charge was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dismissed (R. 25-31, 32-33, 62).l At her sentencing hearing on May 16, 1997, 
defendant's sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on probation (R. 46-47). 
As one condition of probation, defendant was ordered to pay restitution in an amount to 
be determined by the department of probation and parole (id.). 
In January 1998, defendant orally moved for relief from restitution on the ground 
that the victim in this case, a bank, did not qualify as a "victim" under the statutes in effect 
at the time of her sentencing (R. 57-58). Following two hearings, the district court entered 
an order denying defendant's motion (R. 62-64). This appeal ensued (R. 65). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The underlying facts are not in dispute. From June 24, 1995, to September 11, 
1995, defendant falsely made, encoded, or signed a financial transaction card by repeatedly 
using her grandmother's First Security Bank automatic teller machine card ("ATM card") 
without her grandmother's permission (R. 25-26). Defendant's crime resulted in a loss of 
$10,257 to First Security Bank (First Security) (R. 62). 
1
 Defendant's plea agreement states that she pleaded guilty to falsely making, 
coding, or signing a financial transaction card, a third degree felony, in violation of 
section 76-6-506.1 (R.25). Moreover, the conduct described therein constitutes an offense 
under that section (R. 26). However, the judgment, sentence and commitment form 
indicates that she pleaded guilty to forgery, a third degree felony, but does not cite to a 
section of the Utah Code (R. 46). On appeal, defendant states that she was convicted of 
forgery, a third degree felony, but cites to section 76-6-506.1, the falsely making, coding, 
or signing a financial transaction card section. See Aplt. Brief at 1. In any event, because 
both the plea agreement and the judgment, sentence and commitment reflect that defendant 
pleaded guilty to a third degree felony, and defendant has not challenged her conviction 
on the basis of this discrepancy, whether defendant was convicted of falsely making, 
coding, or signing a financial transaction card, or convicted of forgery is not outcome 
determinative here. 
3 
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On November 17, 1995, defendant pleaded guilty to falsely making, coding, or 
signing a financial transaction card, a third degree felony (R. 25-31, 32-33, 62). 
On May 16, 1997, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero-to-five-years 
in the Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a $5000 fine (R. 46-47). However, these 
terms were stayed, and defendant was placed on probation (id.). As one condition of 
probation, defendant was ordered to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by the 
department of probation and parole (id.). 
Defendant subsequently requested a further hearing on the issue of restitution, 
arguing that recent legislation posed questions concerning the restitution ordered at the 
time of defendant's sentencing (R. 57). The court granted defendant's request and held 
a hearing on February 20, 1998 (R. 58, 61, 123:1-5). At that hearing, defendant argued 
that: (1) the relevant statutory provisions in effect at the time of her sentencing required 
that a victim be a "natural person" for purposes of restitution, and (2) a subsequent 
amendment to the restitution statute which eliminated the "natural person" language was 
not retroactive (R. 123:3). Thus, defendant contended, First Security was not entitled to 
restitution from defendant's criminal activities because a bank is not a natural person (id.). 
The hearing was then continued to March 6, 1998 (R. 124:1-17). At that hearing, 
a representative of First Security testified that although the bank holds catastrophic 
insurance with a $1,000,000 deductible, it has no insurance covering loss stemming from 
unauthorized use (R. 124:2). Consequently, in situations where there is illegal use of an 
4 
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ATM card and the customer reports the loss to the bank in a timely manner, the bank 
ultimately sustains the loss (id.). As such, First Security suffered a loss of $10,257 as a 
result of defendant's criminal activities (id.). 
Based on the above evidence, the State argued that First Security was a direct victim 
of defendant's criminal acts and was therefore entitled to restitution in full for the loss 
suffered as a result of defendant's criminal activities (id.). In response, defendant again 
claimed that the bank was not entitled to restitution because it is not a "natural person" as 
defined by the relevant statutes (R. 124:5). Additionally, defendant asserted that the bank 
could not recover its damages through a criminal proceeding but should instead seek civil 
remedies, citing this Court's opinion in State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695 
(Utah App. 1997) as support (R. 124:3-8). 
On March 18,1998, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and order (R. 62-64) (a copy of which is attached hereto as "Addendum A"). In its order, 
the court quoted a recent amendment to Utah's restitution statute which defined "victim" 
to include "any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i) 
(Supp. 1998). Although this statute had an effective date of May 4, 1998, the court 
nonetheless applied it to defendant's case and concluded that under this amendment, 
First Security was entitled to complete restitution from the losses which occurred as a 
result of defendant's criminal activities (R. 63). 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering 
restitution in this case. Specifically, defendant asserts that (1) because First Security is not 
a "natural person," it was not a "victim" as defined by the relevant statutes in effect at the 
time of her sentencing, and (2) the district court erred in applying Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201(l)(e)(i) (Supp. 1998) to her case because its effective date was May 4, 1998. 
As to defendant's second point, the State agrees that the district court should not have 
applied the 1998 version of section 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i) to defendant's case. However, the 
State does not agree that First Security was not a "victim" as defined by the statutes in 
effect at the time of defendant's sentencing. Accordingly, defendant's conviction is 
entitled to affirmance on appeal on the alternative ground that First Security was a 
direct victim of defendant's criminal activities, and therefore, was entitled to restitution 
under the relevant statutes. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY ORDERING RESTITUTION TO BE 
PAID TO A DIRECT VICTIM OF DEFENDANTS 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES. 
As an initial matter, the State concedes that the district court erred in applying Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) to defendant's case. See Addendum A at 2. 
Restitution in this case was ordered at the time of defendant's sentencing, May 16, 1997 
6 
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(see R. 46-47). Subsequently, on March 16, 1998, the district court entered its findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and order denying defendant's motion for relief from 
restitution, from which defendant appeals (R. 62-64). However, the 1998 amendment to 
section 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) did not become effective until almost two months later, 
on May 4, 1998. Thus, the district court incorrectly applied the 1998 amended version of 
section 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) to this case. 
However, it is well settled that this Court may affirm the district court on any 
proper ground. See State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to examine the district court's ultimate conclusion, that First Security is 
entitled to restitution arising as a result of defendant's criminal activities, to determine 
whether the district court's order is nonetheless entitled to affirmance on appeal on the 
alternative ground that First Security qualified as a victim under the statutes in effect at the 
time of defendant's sentencing. 
At the time of defendant's sentencing, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1997) 
provided, in pertinent part: 
(4)(a)(i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes 
of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Section 
77-38-2 
7 
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fcL (emphasis added). At that time, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (Supp. 1997) stated: 
(9)(a) "Victim of a crime" means any natural person 
against whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have 
been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or minor 
personally, or as a party to the offense or conduct or, in the 
discretion of the court, against whom a related crime or act is 
alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted . . . . 
IdL2 
"It is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction 
and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result." State v. GAF 
Corp.. 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted); accord Perrine v. Kennecott 
Mining Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996); Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 
949 P.2d 779, 783 (Utah App. 1997). See also West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 
446 (Utah 1982) (stating that a statute should be interpreted according to its plain language, 
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of 
2
 Section 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) was subsequently amended to read: 
(4)(a)(i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes 
of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Subsection (l)(e). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201 (l)(e) (Supp. 1998) defines "victim" as "any person whom the court determines 
has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." 
However, as noted above, this amendment was not effective until May 4, 1998, and 
therefore, does not control the result in the present case. 
8 
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the express purpose of the statute); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 
(Utah 1980) (observing that "statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all 
parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations are to be avoided which 
render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd"). 
In this case, defendant asserts that under the plain language of the above sections, 
First Security was not a victim for purposes of restitution because it is not a natural person. 
Aplt. Brief at 6-8. Thus, defendant argues, First Security is not entitled to restitution for 
losses incurred as a result of defendant's criminal activities. IdL 
However, reading the statute literally, as defendant does, compels an absurd result. 
For instance, compare the following two scenarios: in the first, a man owns and operates 
a local grocery store as a sole proprietor; in the second, the man who owns and operates 
the local grocery store decides that it is in his own best interest to incorporate. In both 
scenarios, the store is robbed and the perpetrator is apprehended, tried and found guilty. 
The State then seeks restitution on behalf of both victims. If, indeed, defendant's assertion 
that only natural persons come within the ambit of section 76-3-201, then the former would 
fall within the literal, plain meaning of the statutory language, while the latter would not. 
Certainly the Utah Legislature did not intend such absurd results. 
Instead, applying the plain meaning rule in such a fashion as defendant does distorts 
and seriously undermines the legislative intent. Consequently, the more well-reasoned and 
sensible construction of the 1997 version of sections 76-3-201 and 77-38-2 leads to the 
9 
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conclusion that the legislature enacted that version to prevent restitution being paid to 
secondary victims, such as insurance companies, while still permitting direct victims to be 
able to recover restitution. See State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah App. 1997) 
(insurance company not a victim because "the crime was not perpetrated against the 
insurance company personally or as a party"). Moreover, such a construction is in 
harmony with the clear purpose of Utah's restitution statute, "that defendants] make 
restitution to victims of crime." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997). 
Additionally, defendant argues on appeal that First Security was not a "victim" 
because defendant did not "personally" perpetrate a crime against the bank. Aplt. Brief 
at 8-ll.3 Specifically, defendant argues that First Security was not a direct victim of 
defendant's criminal activities, but merely "an incidental, contractual party involved in the 
matter." Aplt. Brief at 10. However, this argument is wholly without support in the 
record. The undisputed evidence before the district court was that although the bank holds 
catastrophic insurance with a $1,000,000 deductible, it has no insurance covering loss 
stemming from unauthorized use (R. 124:2). Consequently, in situations where there is 
illegal use of an ATM card and the customer reports the loss to the bank in a timely 
manner, the bank ultimately sustains the loss (id.). As such, First Security was the direct 
3
 In support of this argument, defendant cites several cases from other jurisdictions. 
Aplt. Brief at 9-10. However, this Court has previously found these cases to be 
"of limited assistance" because "they involve statutes with language different than Utah's." 
Westerman. 945 P.2d at 698. Accordingly, the State will not address these cases. 
10 
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victim of defendant's crime and suffered a loss of $10,257 as a result of defendant's 
criminal activities (id.). Thus, it is patently clear that First Security was, indeed, a direct 
victim of defendant's criminal activities. 
Lastly, defendant's reliance on Westerman in support of her position is misplaced. 
As recently noted by this Court in State v. Stirba. No. 981383, slip op. (Utah App. 
December 24, 1998), "the restitution order challenged in Westerman was an order 
mandating payment of restitution directly to the victim's insurer." Id. at 9 n.4 (citing 
Westerman. 945 P.2d at 696). The Court went on to say that "Westerman has no 
application absent an order specifically requiring the defendant pay restitution directly to 
an insurance company." H (citing State v. Haga. 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App. 
1998)). In contrast to Westerman. the restitution order in the present case was to be paid 
to a direct victim of defendant's criminal activities, not to a secondary victim, such as an 
insurance company. See idL Accordingly, as in Stirba, the holding in Westerman has no 
application here. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the district court erred in applying the 1998 amended version of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) to defendant's case, the court nonetheless reached the 
correct conclusion that First Security is entitled to restitution for losses incurred as a result 
of defendant's criminal activities. Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that this 
11 
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Court affirm the district court's order denying defendant's motion for relief from 
restitution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 i _ day of January, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
GORMAN E. PLATE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were mailed by first class mail this 2!L day of January, 1999, to the following: 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC 
KRISTINE M. ROGERS 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
MELANIE E. POMKALA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 






18 MAR. 1998 
PAT B.BRIAN 
This matter came before the Court on a Restitution Hearing of Defendant's 
Motion for Relief from Restitution held February 20,1998. The parties were present and 
represented by counsel. The Court heard evidence and argument, and hereby makes the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 17, 1995 Defendant Melanie E. Pomikala, represented by 
counsel, entered a guilty plea to forgery, a third degree felony. The charged stemmed from 
Defendant's unauthorized repeated use of a First Security Bank automatic teller machine card. 
2. On May 16,1997, Defendant was sentenced for the felony, and, as part of the 
terms and conditions of her probation, was ordered to pay restitution at a rate of $100.00 per 
month until 10/1/97, and then $400.00 per month beginning 10/1/97 plus 8 percent per annum 
interest. 
3. At the Restitution Hearing held February 20,1998, a First Security Bank 
representative testified that the Defendant stole $10,257.00 from the bank through the 
unauthorized repeated use of a First Security Bank automatic teller machine card. 
1 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. "When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages..." this Court "shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime....For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in subsection 1(e)." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-201(4)(a)(I) (Supp. 1998). 
2. House Bill 378 amends Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 and clarifies the 
definition of victim. Utah Code Ann. §76-3 -201(e)(1) states: '"Victim* means any person whom 
the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities." 
3. Defendant stole $10,257.00 from First Security Bank and the Bank is entitled 
to complete restitution of that amount plus interest. 
ORDER 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Restitution is hereby DENIED. All the terms 
and conditions of probation as set forth in Defendant's May 16,1997 sentence remain in full 
effect. 
DATED this /A day of / ^ ? rfA <* (r^ , 1998 
BY THE COURT: 
PAt B.BRIAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
(*3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this M day of _ THICMJLS 1998, 
I caused to be mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true copy of the foregoing NOTICE to: 
KRISTINE W.ROGERS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH #300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
HOWARD R. LEMCKE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
DATED this (1 day of "T^Ahtk^ 1998 
Z \ i j ^ UhhlWx 
tLERK 
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